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THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: 
THE REALITY BEHIND THE MYTH 
Gerald F. Moran* 
INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE. By Garry Wills. Garden City, New York: Double-
day & Company, Inc. 1978. Pp. xxvi, 398. $10.00. 
The Declaration of Independence exerts a considerable, if 
often imperceptible, influence over our civil and political culture, 
as does the history that brought it to life. Political actions are 
often undertaken in defense of its governing principles, it fre-
quently sets the tone of civic oratory and rhetoric, and it often 
guides this country's perceptions of itself. The Declaration's 
power resides in its evocative preamble and in the drama of 
founding fathers bringing forth a unique republican nation dedi-
cated to certain laudable values and universal ideals. All the 
ceremony and celebration of a Fourth of July testify to the cen-
trality of this drama in our national life. 
But the Declaration of Independence, as we know and use it 
today, is largely symbolic, for it conveys meanings to us beyond 
those intended in 1776, and it also evokes ideals and images that 
few eighteenth-century men and women employed. Different gen-
erations tended to read their own special history and philosophy 
into it, so that layer upon layer of myth now encase it. We ur-
gently need studies devoted to resurrecting the meaning of the 
Declaration in light of its precise historical context, otherwise we 
will continue to misapprehend the myths of our political culture, 
misunderstand the disjunction between national symbol and na-
tional history, and misread the history that produced such impor-
tant documents as the American Constitution. 
Inventing America is one such study. Written by a well-
. known journalist, adjunct professor of humanities at Johns Hop-
kins University, and author of several well-known books, includ-
ing Nixon Agonistes and Bare Ruined Choirs, it sets out to expose 
the myth and the reality behind the Declaration and its history. 
Consider, for example, the pervasive belief that Congress ac-
cepted and signed the Declaration on July 4, 1776, thus initiating 
the American Revolution. Actually, the Pontinental Congress for-
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mally announced its separation from England on July 2, when it 
approved Richard Henry Lee's resolution for independence, and 
then it went about the more pressing business of negotiating a 
treaty with France, devising articles of unification, and conduct-
ing a war. Delegates to Congress began signing a formal Declara-
tion on August 2, in commemoration and explanation of actions 
already undertaken, and quickly forgot about it. Not until many 
years later, really after the War of 1812, did Americans turn to 
the Declaration and a mythical July Fourth signing as somehow 
bringing forth a new republican nation. 
When they did, they struck upon the preamble and its princi-
ples, paying little heed to the great bulk of the document, the list 
of grievances against Gei:,rge ill. The grievances were tied to a 
forgotten history, the preamble was not. It contained ideals which 
could be applied in different ways to different historical circum-
stances, and during the nineteenth century it began to take on a 
life of its own, shaping events and being shaped by them. In 
November 1863, Abraham Lincoln produced one of many endur-
ing interpretations of the preamble and its history. "Four score 
and seven years ago," he proclaimed at Gettysburg, "our fathers 
brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in lib-
erty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created 
equal." The war the North was engaged in would test "whether 
that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long 
endure." Men had died in battle so that "that nation might live." 
We should "highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in 
vain-that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of 
freedom-and that government of the people, by the people, for 
the people, shall not perish from the earth." 
Here, as elsewhere, according to Garry Wills, history became 
myth. Lincoln had proposed that in 1776 men who were united 
in purpose had created a union of lasting value and significance. 
In fact, the delegates at Philadelphia, who first convened as a. 
Congress in September 1774, were men with little sense of nation 
but with strong provincial loyalties, men of "competing interests 
and cultures" who were able nevertheless to agree on a tactic to 
seek redress of grievances committed by England. They decided 
to use the petition (and not the courts, which were limited to 
breeches of statute or positive law) to addres!jl the British govern-
ment on its violations against "fundamental law," and once they 
defined what that law was, they struggled to create a joint list of 
legitimate complaints out of thirteen separate and often antagon-
istic ones. Most of the delegates agreed on principles. "The differ-
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ences arose over application of 'fundamental law' to particular 
acts, listed one by one, as part of a system at odds with the whole 
ethos of the British constitution" (p. 64). When England ignored 
the petitions of 1774 and 1775, Congress felt compelled to under-
take a revolution, (by its view, a reasoned defense of the colonists' 
rights as Englishmen) and to declare that legal pleas had failed 
to thwart the perverse acts of a tyrannical monarch. Indepen-
dence was the logical result of the failure of the petition, while 
the Declaration itself, as passed by Congress, was the expression 
of a consensus on certain constitutional grievances which together 
justified revolution. 
This Declaration, Wills argues, is political, while our Decla-
ration is symbolic, and Thomas Jefferson's Declaration, which 
Congress altered severely, is philosophical. The differences be-
tween each of these three versions "have been both underrated 
and misstated" (p. ix). What of Jefferson's text? This question, 
which is crucial to an understanding of the differences, is the 
central concern of Inventing America. What did Jefferson mean 
by what he said? "To understand any text remote from us in 
time, we must reassemble a world around that text. The precon-
ceptions of the original audience, its tastes, its range of reference, 
must be recovered, so far as that is possible. We must forget what 
was learned, or what occurred, in the interval between our time 
and the text's. We must resurrect beliefs now discarded" (p. 269). 
This is Wills's strategy. To understand truly Jefferson's draft of 
the Declaration, the one he wrote at the behest of a congressional 
committe.e in June 1776, it is necessary to reconstruct his lost 
intellectual world and the philosophy to which he adhered. 
Wills consciously adopts a Jeffersonian style in his pursuit of 
precision and clarity. The Virginia planter, like the preamble he 
wrote, is often considered idealistic and visionary. But, as Wills 
contends, he was an empiricist, not an idealist. Mathematics and 
statistics fascinated him, and he sought, among other things, a 
political science of numbers to measure public happiness. He 
avoided the metaphysical for the observable, disliked theory and 
generalization, and felt that ideas should be grounded upon real-
ity. As it changed, so should the ideas it aroused. And as each 
generation underwent new experiences, it would discover new 
laws. 
But Jefferson, if guided by experience, was also attached 
primarily to sentiment and the emotional in man. He considered 
the Head inferior to the Heart. The Head could only reflect pas-
sively upon means to ends, upon technique and strategy, while 
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the Heart, the domain of duty, morality, and virtue, was "a prin-
ciple of action," the higher faculty that determined ends and 
motives. Wills, unlike many other scholars, contends that Jeffer-
son actually made the Heart win out over the Head in his famous 
letter of 1786 to Maria Cosway. Jefferson, the scientist and math-
ematician, was somehow a devotee of the sentimental in man; he, 
like Voltaire, advocated a religion of the Heart. 
Take, for example, one of the several passages Congress ex-
cised from his Declaration, a passage of over three-hundred 
words. Intended as the climax to his text, it bristled with emotion 
as Jefferson went beyond ministry, Parliament, and King to at-
tack the "British brethren" for allowing the English government 
to exercise a corrupt and damaging rule over America. By closing 
ears to just complaints, by failing to remove British rulers, "the 
disturbers of our harmony," from power, and by permitting 
George ill to invade the colonies with mercenaries, they had 
"given the last stab to agonizing affection," and thus, he pro-
claimed, "manly spirit bids us to renounce for ever these unfeel-
ing brethren." Americans must now "endeavor to forget our for-
mer love for them," he continued, "and to hold them as we hold 
the rest of mankind enemies in war, in peace friends. We might 
have been a free and a great people together; but a communica-
tion of grandeur & of freedom it seems is below their dignity. Be 
it so, since they will have it. The road to happiness & to glory is 
open to us too. We will tread it apart from them, and acquiesce 
in the necessity which denounces our eternal separation" (p. 378). 
When it eliminated these passages, and also those on slavery, 
Congress altered profoundly the real meaning of Jefferson's Dec-
laration, leaving "one people" and "political bands" as isolated 
traces of its original, overarching design. Congress saw the Decla-
ration as "a propaganda 9verture, addressed primarily to France, 
which the treaty was meant to follow" (p. 333), but Jefferson had 
had something different in mind. Although he had managed to 
voice the common sentiment on grievances, he had let slip, when 
unhampered by practical and political considerations, some un-
common personal observations, which Congress later scratched. 
Where most Americans felt that the King was the last link 
between them and England, and independence was a matter of 
severing ties with him, Jefferson believed otherwise. His 
"declaration of independence," Wills indicates, "is a renuncia-
tion of unfeeling brethren. His whole document was shaped to 
make that clear" (p. 319). His "political bands" of .empire did not 
rest upon submission, sovereignty, or the power of rulers over 
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ruled, but rather upon brotherhood, respect, and trust, upon 
affections and sentiments that made any people "one." A society 
or political community could not exist without mutual benevo-
lence, nor could compacts promote sociability where none pre-
vailed. Independence signalled the creation of a new community 
of people who were still capable of acting and feeling in consort. 
Jefferson allowed his Heart to rule his Head when forced to 
explain English actions and their possible consequences for 
Americans. He and other colonists not only employed legal prin-
ciples in defense of their rights as Englishmen, but also used such 
terms as "corruption," "power," "conspiracy," "virtue," and 
"liberty" in political discourse which was often animated and 
bombastic. These notions, according to recent studies, were part 
and parcel of a republican world view, a Revolutionary ideology 
that was shaped by the colonists' highly selective reading and by 
their special situation-their remoteness from the locus of sover-
eignty, for example. They tended to overreact to any unconstitu-
tional act, however slight, because they believed that corruption 
could easily permeate a system and lead officials to conspire for 
power at the expense of public liberty. During the imperial crisis, 
and when the old order was beginning to dissolve, many Ameri-
cans sought to promote virtue, patriotism, or the common good 
in defense of liberty against corrupt, power-hungry Englishmen. 
This republican ideology had very little to do with John 
Locke's Two Treatises of Government, as scholars have recently 
shown. Nor did the Two Treatises inform Jefferson's philosophy 
at the time he wrote the Declaration of Independence, as Carl 
Becker once maintained. Jefferson was not a Lockean individual-
ist who believed in a social compact based on property rights. 
Moreover, Wills says, he "was opposed to the individualist vision 
of private enterprise" (p. 366). His communitarian value system 
did not square with the nineteenth century's reading of John 
Locke. 
Rather, he was devoted to the Scottish Enlightenment and 
its moral-sense philosophy. Such men as David Hume, Thomas 
Reid, William Small (his tutor at William and Mary), and Fran-
cis Hutcheson (whose writings he especially valued), guided him 
when he wrote phrases like "the pursuit of happiness" and "all 
men are created equal," phrases that today seem abstract and 
visionary. When Jefferson substituted "pursuit of happiness" for 
Locke's "property" in the pantheon of inalienable rights, he in-
tended to say that unless men were allowed to follow their in-
stincts for the natural good, the body politic would flounder. Be-
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cause moral sense enabled men to take pleasure in benevolent 
acts and to perceive mutual benevolence as the highest good, they 
were capable of transcending the self and working for the well-
being of all people. The free pursuit of public happiness was, for 
Jefferson, the backbone of any free society, state, or government. 
Like "pursuit of happiness," "all men are created equal" has 
confounded historians who have failed to read the Declaration in 
light of moral-sense philosophy. Jefferson felt that all men were 
equal, not necessarily before God or the law, or in the free market-
place, but because they were endowed with the same Heart. Ine-
qualities in sentiment existed only because of inadequate educa-
tion and nurture. At the basis of his whole political creed was "the 
belief that all men possess an equal and automatically function-
ing moral sense, to serve as the ground for rights and self-rule" 
{p. 285). 
According to Wills, Scottish philosophy also held sway over 
Jefferson's thinking on slavery. Blacks, he believed, were born 
with the same instincts and sentiments, the same Heart, as 
whites, but slavery crippled their moral-sense faculties. He sug-
gested that all slaves born after a certain date be educated apart 
from their parents, and then, when they became adults, be de-
ported at Virginia's expense to another territory, where they 
could pursue their instincts and live in freedom· and happiness. 
Individual manumission, on the other hand, would lead only to 
race war and genocide, for how could the oppressed be expected 
to unite peacefully with the oppressor? Society, like government, 
functioned best when people had similar .interests and shared a 
common ethos; without mutual benevolence, people would divide 
into parties and internal warfare would ensue. For the same rea-
sons he opposed the continued migration of whites into Virginia, 
American ties to a decadent Europe, and the continued union of 
colonists with their unfeeling brethren, he objected to individual 
emancipation as inimical to social homogeneity, fraternity, and 
peace. 
Of course, a plantation culture was also at stake here. Did 
paternalism and economic self-interest enter into Jefferson's 
thinking on slavery? If so, how? Wills does not say. He main-
tains that Jefferson was thoroughly consistent in his philosophy 
and in his views on such matters as slavery, but he fails to demon-
strate that plantation exigencies did not interfere with his im-
ported ideas. Because Wills relies heavily upon textual parallels 
and thematic echoes to expose an ideational network, he risks 
overlooking possible ambiguities and contradictions resulting 
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from tensions between ideals and experience. With all his under-
standing of Scottish philosophy, he would have done well to have 
shown us where Jefferson's ethos either resisted or absorbed the 
culture of the plantation and the interests of the slaveholder. 
Wills also argues that Jefferson was equally consistent in 
political principle and that neither he nor many other men of 
his generation, shifted strategy from 1776 to 1787, when the Con-
stitution was formulated. No contradictions, Wills says, existed 
between the convention of 1787 and Revolutionary ideals, for the 
same men supported both movements and adhered to the same 
ideas, including a theory of social counterpoise which flowed into 
federalism. Much of this is true. But what should we make of the 
presidency, among other constitutional innovations? The men 
who created a powerful government in 1787, one that rode rough-
shod over the states, had the problems of post-war America in 
mind, not those of the Revolution. During the 1780s Americans 
turned inward to resolve domestic issues, and old words tended 
to acquire new meanings. Where "power" had once expressed 
concern for executive tyranny, it now conveyed anxieties about 
legislative oppression. Where liberty had been considered in pub-
lic terms, it now was interpreted more privately by some people 
who sought to protect property and creditors' rights and to facili-
tate commerce. Where "virtue" had once been used to gauge the 
extent of English corruption, it now conveyed anxieties about 
American morality and the country's ability to survive as a re-
public, so brittle had republics proved to be in the past. The 
Constitution combined both the old and the new, both the locale 
and the nation, for example. 
I doubt whether the colonists could have achieved any com-
mon intellectual front within Wills's America of disparate com-
munities and cultures, where each province maintained closer 
ties with England than with one another and where a bewildering 
variety of regions and social groupings existed. Certainly no sense 
of nation could have prevailed before 1776. Or could it have? 
More and more after the mid-eighteenth-century colonial elites 
travelled to England and there rubbed shoulders with other colo-
nists who were likewise pursuing an education, promoting politi-
cal causes, and arranging business alliances. Newspapers in 
America also proliferated after the 1740s, thus promoting com-
munication, and contacts among merchants increased as trade 
escalated. The imperial crisis brought together many lawyers, 
merchants, and planters in intercolonial assemblies, where they 
worked out a united resistance to England and created a common 
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wartime strategy. These men developed a precocious sense of 
nation even before 1776, and after then they became increasingly 
committed to the idea of a central government. At the same time, 
provincial and local loyalties prevailed among many groups of 
people, some of whom were to be found in the back country. Their 
particularistic attitudes cropped up in resistance to the Constitu-
tion. 
Despite some of its oversights, Inventing America is an im-
portant and exciting work, one which should be read for what it 
says about the history behind our national niyths. Wills exposes 
a significant source of Revolutionary ideas. He shows the import-
ance of placing texts in their historical context and of approach-
ing such terms as democracy, liberty, equality, and rights only 
with reference to their original meaning and shifting cultural and 
historical milieu. He enters a necessary warning against project-
ing the nineteenth-century mystique of the self-made man into 
earlier eras, especially the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
He, like other recent historians, demonstrates that historical pre-
cedents do exist for considering American society and politics in 
terms of the family and the community, not the individual. Too 
few of us today have been willing to concede that we live in a 
pluralistic society of subcommunities and subcultures, not an 
unwieldy composite of isolated, competing individuals. Inventing 
America should excite further attempts to uncover the real mean-
ing of 1776. 
